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Abstract 
 
This paper sets out to explain national preferences on the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) concerning: support for creating and participating in 
supranational banking supervision in the European Union; the division of 
competences between the European Central Bank and national banking supervisors; 
the nature of indirect supervision. It is argued that member states in the euro area 
faced a ‘financial inconsistent quartet’, whereby they could not secure at the same 
time: 1) financial stability, 2) financial integration, 3) national financial policies and 
4) the single currency. The ‘financial inconsistent quartet’ reinforced the logic for 
euro area member states to create the SSM (and other elements of Banking Union) 
and those seeking to join the euro area to participate. However, the analytical 
usefulness of this concept to explain national preferences on the SSM relies upon its 
nuanced application to individual countries taking into account the distinct patterns 
in the internationalisation of national banking systems. 
 
Introduction 
 
In June 2012, the European Council agreed to deepen Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) by creating ‘Banking Union’ (BU), which was to be based on five 
components: a single rulebook of European Union (EU) financial regulation and 
competition policy; a single framework for banking supervision; a single framework 
for the managed resolution of banks and financial institutions; a common deposit 
guarantee scheme; and a common backstop for temporary financial support. The 
proposals for BU amounted to a radical initiative to rebuild financial market 
confidence in both banks and sovereigns – especially in the euro area periphery – to 
stabilise the national banking systems exposed directly to a vicious circle between the 
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international financial crisis and the euro area’s sovereign debt crisis (see Hall 2014, 
Hansen, et al. 2014, Leblond 2014; Mourlon-Druol 2014) and to reverse the 
fragmentation of European financial markets. BU is also set to bring about a 
significant transfer of powers from the national to the EU (to be precise, the BU) level.  
 
The first key component of BU to be agreed was the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM), which was proposed by the Commission in September 2012 and approved by 
government leaders at the December 2012 European Council. The compromise 
reached foresaw that the ECB would be ‘responsible for the overall effective 
functioning of the SSM’ and would have ‘direct oversight of the euro area banks’ 
(European Council 2012a, p. 2). This supervision however would be ‘differentiated’ 
and the Bank would carry it out in ‘close cooperation with national supervisory 
authorities’. Direct ECB supervision (through Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs)) was to 
cover those banks with assets exceeding €30 billion or those whose assets represent at 
least 20 per cent of their home country’s annual GDP. Non euro area member states 
could opt for participation in the SSM through a ‘closer cooperation’ arrangement. 
 
This paper sets out to explain national preferences on the establishment, membership 
and the scope of the SSM. The analysis focuses upon the preferences of national 
policy-makers, first and foremost the ministries of finance, which were the most 
involved in the SSM negotiations. However, as substantiated in the empirical analysis 
below -- notably with reference to bank position papers to the Commission’s 
consultation on the SSM -- the preferences of the national authorities were aligned 
with the dominant preferences of their national banking sector. 
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National preferences on the SSM are important as they shaped the negotiating 
positions of the member states and eventually the outcome of the negotiations. Impact 
on outcome explains the selection of two of our cases. We focus on German 
preferences given the ‘constrained’ veto-power exercised by Germany in negotiations 
on the SSM (Bulmer 2014) and on French preferences given the importance of 
cooperative Franco-German hegemony in the euro area (Pedersen 1998). The 
positions on SSM participation of EU member states not participating in the euro area 
(the euro outsiders) are also relevant for our study because of the latitude of choice on 
membership they enjoyed -- unlike the euro area member states which had to join 
even if they were reluctant to do so. (Non)membership of euro outsiders is a clearer 
indicator of preferences than very reluctant membership by euro area member states. 
 
Theoretically, the paper develops and applies the concept of the ‘financial 
inconsistent quartet’, meaning that euro area member states cannot secure at the same 
time: 1) financial stability, 2) financial integration in the context of cross-border 
banking, 3) national financial policies (regulation, supervision and resolution) and 4) 
the single currency -- which deprives euro area member states of a lender of last resort 
and shapes internationalisation patterns notably by increasing euro area bank 
exposure to the euro periphery. The paper also argues that the analytical usefulness of 
this concept to explain national preferences on the SSM relies upon its nuanced 
application to individual countries taking into consideration the distinct configuration 
of national banking systems.  
 
Our analysis considers: the degree of banking system concentration; the degree of 
internationalisation; exposure to the euro area periphery and the degree of foreign 
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bank penetration. In a nutshell, German policy was shaped by strong political pressure 
to protect the country’s public sector and cooperative banks from European-level 
scrutiny. French policy on the SSM was more positive but was also driven by 
reluctance to cede national control over the day-to-day supervision of the five largest 
French banks and concerns that SSM supervision would be asymmetric. The non-
participation of several euro outsiders can be explained by both non-euro membership 
and the configuration of the national banking system.   
 
This paper contributes to two main bodies of scholarly literature. First, it adds to the 
emerging literature on the politics and political economy of BU (Donnelly 2014; 
Epstein and Rhodes 2014; Howarth and Quaglia 2013, 2014; Schimmelfennig 2014; 
Salines et al. 2012, Spendzharova 2014) which feeds into the vast literature on EMU 
and European economic governance, more generally, and national preference 
formation on EMU, more specifically (for example, Dyson 2000; Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999; Verdun 2000; Walsh 2000). Rather than focusing on the dynamics 
of the intergovernmental negotiations on the SSM, this work teases out and explains 
the preferences of the main member states, rooted in their domestic political economy.  
 
Second, the paper contributes to the (limited) comparative political economy literature 
on national financial systems (Allen and Gale 2000; Deeg 2010; Hardie and Howarth 
2013) by examining how the specific features of national banking systems can direct 
government preferences on both national and supranational financial regulation and 
supervisory frameworks. This paper also adds to Peter Hall’s (2014) analysis of 
varieties of capitalism and the sovereign debt crisis, even though the focus of this 
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paper is on the different configurations of national banking systems across the EU, 
rather than varieties of capitalism as such. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature 
and outlines our analytical framework, explaining how different EU member state 
positions in the ‘inconsistent quartet’ led some to push for Banking Union, others to 
accept with great reluctance and some euro outsiders to opt to stay out. Sections 3 to 5 
explain how national preferences on the key aspects of the SSM were shaped by the 
configuration of national banking systems in Germany, France and non euro area 
member states (notably the UK), interacting with considerations stemming from the 
‘inconsistent quartet’.  
 
2. The theoretical framework: the inconsistent quartet and national banking 
systems 
 
The paper takes as a starting point Dirk Schoenmaker’s ‘financial trilemma’ (2013; 
Wagner and Schoenmaker 2011), which examines the interplay of financial stability, 
international banking and national ‘financial policies’ and leads to the argument that 
financial stability in the context of cross-border banking requires the transfer of 
‘financial policies’ (regulation, supervision, financial support and resolution) to the 
supranational level. Schoenmaker focuses upon global bank governance but he 
dedicates a brief conclusion to the prospect of European BU. While Schoenmaker 
presents an economic analysis to explain the existence of the trilemma, our paper 
examines national preference formation with regard to the three objectives of the 
trilemma and how this shaped national policies on the SSM. 
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We argue that in the EU, to be precise in EMU, there is a fourth element to be 
considered, namely the single currency, which deprives member states of a lender of 
last resort. Hence, the trilemma becomes an ‘inconsistent quartet’. We borrow from 
Padoa-Schioppa’s (1982) use of the term, applied to the context of European 
monetary integration, just as Schoenmaker’s trilemma borrows from Mundell-
Fleming. On the one hand, the single currency reinforced financial (banking) 
integration in the euro area and -- of particular relevance in the context of the 
sovereign debt crisis -- increased euro area bank exposure to the euro periphery. On 
the other hand, the single currency undermined national ‘financial policies’ because 
the function of lender of last resort could no longer, legally, be performed at the 
national level1 and the adjustment tool of currency devaluation was eliminated. 
Moreover, national support powers were constrained by EU competition policy and 
national bank resolution powers by fiscal rules.  
 
National governments can only have three of the four elements of the quartet. EU 
member state government that had no intention of joining the euro area in the near 
future (notably, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and the Czech Republic) did 
not have the fourth element of the quartet, namely the single currency. They could in 
effect cope better with the instability created by cross-border banking -- and thus the 
financial trilemma -- because they retained their lender of last resort powers (for 
                                                
1 At the beginning of the third stage of EMU there was an intense debate about the 
function of lender of last resort in EMU (see Goodhart 1999, 2000; Begg et al, 
1998a,b). 
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banks) through both monetary and fiscal policy. Thus policy makers in these countries 
had less incentive to seek participation in BU. 
 
However, national governments that sought to maintain their euro area membership in 
the context of cross-border banking, were compelled to surrender control over 
national bank regulation and supervision in order more effectively to cope with 
financial instability. Euro area member state governments (in some cases with great 
reluctance) had more incentive to move to BU. If national authorities wanted to 
maintain control over regulation and supervision they were compelled to accept the 
loss of either euro area membership or cross-border banking (or both) in order better 
to combat financial instability.  
 
The inconsistent quartet also suggests that, ceteris paribus, a euro area member state 
less exposed to cross-border banking would be more reluctant to lose control over 
regulation and supervision because this member state is less subject of financial 
instability coming from abroad. Central and Eastern European member states of the 
EU that had banking systems dominated by foreign (mostly euro area) owned banks 
had an incentive to join BU because they were not in a position to safeguard financial 
stability domestically. The prospective of euro area future membership also shaped 
national interest. Thus, the first of two hypotheses tested in this paper:  
 
H1: Euro area membership is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for MS 
support for the SSM / Banking Union. However, membership encourages support 
especially by having eliminated lender of last resort and by having distorted patterns 
of internationalisation. 
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Although the quartet applies to all countries in the euro area, its effects vary 
depending on the level and nature of national banking system internationalisation. 
There is a small but growing political economy literature on financial systems, 
starting with Zysman’s (1983) pioneering work, followed by Allen and Gale (2000), 
Busch (2009), Deeg (2010) and Hardie and Howarth (2013) – which engage in a 
comparative analysis of financial (or specifically banking) systems. Other political 
economy authors have focused on specific national banking systems, such as 
Germany (Deeg 1999; Hardie and Howarth 2013), the UK (Hardie and Maxfield 2013; 
Macartney 2014), France (Clift 2012; Howarth 2013), Italy and Spain (Quaglia and 
Royo 2014; Royo 2012) and the CEECs (Epstein 2013; Johnson and Barnes 2014; 
Spendzharova 2014).  
 
This body of scholarly work has pointed out a variety of important features of 
national bank systems. For example, Hardie and Howarth (2013) highlight the 
importance of the degree of ‘market-based’ assets -- that is to what extent banks 
invest in non-traditional banking activities. Analyses of banking systems in CEECs 
have focused on foreign bank penetration – especially by euro area banks – pointing 
out the problems that this poses for domestic (host) supervisors in charge of 
safeguarding financial stability in these countries. Building on this literature, our 
analysis of national banking systems considers their internationalisation (according to 
different measures) of assets. We thus develop on Schoenmaker’s understanding of 
cross-border banking in order to better understand national preference formation on 
supranational bank supervision. 
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Schoenmaker seeks to explain the contribution to international financial instability 
that large cross-border banks can make. However, his econometric analysis presents 
only a limited picture of the internationalisation of national banking systems which 
might motivate governments and supervisors to reinforce international cooperation in 
bank supervision and even move to supranational control. The analysis in this paper 
considers three pertinent measures of internationalisation and Europeanisation. First, 
it considers the percentage of assets held internationally, in the EU and in the euro 
area versus domestically held bank assets (Figure 2 and Table 1). On this, the 
prediction is that the higher the percentage of bank assets elsewhere in the euro area 
the greater the support for supranational supervision to ensure better control over 
these assets, especially when they are held by a subsidiary.  
 
Second, the analysis considers, more specifically, bank exposure to the euro periphery 
-- Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland -- in total terms and relative to total bank 
assets (Table 2). The prediction here is that higher the exposure the greater the 
support for creating supranational supervision that would cover a range of banks in 
these countries. Third, the analysis considers the degree of foreign (notably other EU 
headquartered) bank penetration, measured as a percentage of total national bank 
assets that are held by foreign banks (Table 3). Foreign penetration through 
subsidiaries is another important feature of cross-border banking. Here the prediction 
is that member states dominated by the subsidiaries of foreign banks headquartered in 
other EU (and specifically euro area) member states will seek supranational banking 
supervision in order to ensure better and more uniform control of cross-border 
banking groups with a strong presence in their country.  
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These three predictions lead to the following, second, hypothesis as to how the 
configuration of the national banking system shapes/influences national preferences 
on the SSM. 
 
H2: Higher the internationalisation to other euro area member states and / or higher 
the foreign penetration from the euro area, greater the support for creating / joining 
the SSM and widening the scope of direct ECB supervision.  
 
To conclude this section, methodologically, this paper deploys a two-step political 
economy analysis. First, it undertakes a comparative political economy analysis of 
national banking systems, examining their internationalisation and concentration -- 
the latter is a further measure of relevance in particular because higher concentration 
correlates grosso modo with greater internationalisation. Second, this paper examines 
how these features of the banking system shape policy makers preferences on the 
SSM. This is done through textual analysis of policy documents, a systematic survey 
of press coverage and semi-structured elite interviews with policy makers across the 
EU.   
 
This analysis does not overlook ‘politics’ (meaning ‘political negotiations’) either at 
the European level or at the domestic level (borrowing from Putnam’s two-level game 
(1988)). It rather explains why the main policy makers at each ‘level’ -- notably 
ministries of finance -- had certain preferences and sought to pursue them through 
political negotiations in the EU and domestically. The outcome of the SSM 
negotiations was a compromise between the main member states, where Germany had 
most (but, by no means, all) of its preferences on the institutional features of the SSM 
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accommodated because this country had strong bargaining power. Similarly, at the 
domestic level, there was lobbying from the financial sector in each member state (in 
some, more than in others). For example, as mentioned in Section 3, the German 
Sparkassen engaged – collectively through their representative association – in 
extensive lobbying at home and abroad. The position of financial lobbies also 
reflected very directly the structural features of national banking systems examined 
here. 
  
3. Germany and the SSM: defending the hausbank model 
 
The German banking system was both the least concentrated (Figure 1) in Europe and, 
excluding its two commercial giants, the least internationalised of the six largest 
national banking systems (see Figure 2 and Table 1). Although Germany was home to 
one very big, highly internationalised, commercial bank – Deutsche Bank – and a 
second very big commercial bank with a significant European presence – 
Commerzbank – there were also thousands of undercapitalized public and small local 
banks which provide the bulk of funding to, and maintain close relations with, small 
and medium sized enterprises (see also Donnelly 2014). Almost one-third of the euro 
area’s banks were German. The bulk of bank assets were nationally held with the 
exception of the biggest two and a small number of the other, much smaller, 
commercial banks.  
 
According to the second hypothesis, with limited internationalisation on a range of 
measures, one would expect less German support for BU generally and, more 
specifically, in the transfer of supervisory powers to the ECB -- despite German 
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participation in the single currency. This also confirms the first hypothesis, whereby 
membership of the single currency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
a country to support the SSM. The inconsistent quartet was less acute for Germany. 
German policy makers reluctantly agreed to the SSM with clear evidence of 
backtracking in the weeks following the June declaration on Banking Union 
(Financial Times 10 October 2012) and a repeatedly stated preference that only the 
two largest German banks -- the only German banks with a significant cross-border 
presence (more than 5 per cent of total assets) in 2012 should be subject to direct ECB 
supervision (Financial Times 5 December 2012; interviews BaFin official, Berlin, 30 
October 2014).  
 
German bank exposure to euro periphery sovereign debt might well have piqued 
German government interest in the development of supranational control. However, 
this exposure dropped significantly in the years following the outbreak of the 
sovereign debt crisis (Table 2). Also, in line with the second hypothesis, the stated 
preference of German policy-makers was that ECB supervision must not extend to 
cover the country’s public Landesbanken (LB) and Sparkassen (savings banks) 
(Financial Times, 5 December 2012). By the December 2012 European Council, 
however, it had become clear that the German federal government was willing to 
compromise and set the threshold to extend direct ECB supervision to the LB.   
 
The slightly more than 420 Sparkassen and 1200 Cooperative banks (2011 figures) 
were local or regionally based banks with a vested interest in the local economy and a 
strong presence in local community life. In late 2012, the largest Saving Bank had a 
balance sheet of approximately €40bn about one-fiftieth that of Deutsche Bank and 
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more than 100 had less than a billion euros in assets (Bundesbank; Financial Times, 2 
December 2012) but collectively they were responsible for 38 per cent of German 
bank lending and held 37 per cent of the country’s bank deposits (Bundesbank, end 
2012 figures). Sparkassen directors appeared to be unanimous in their view that home 
regulators and supervisors better understood their characteristics and way of doing 
business (Simpson 2013; Financial Times, 2 December 2012). The close connections 
between the Sparkassen and local and other German politicians encouraged federal 
government support for the protection of existing practices and the policy of 
extending direct ECB supervision to only systemically important banks (Busch 2009; 
Deeg 1999).   
 
German government preferences and negotiating positions largely aligned with those 
of German banks (BDB 2013; BVR/VÖB/DSGV 2012). Only the two largest German 
commercial banks expressed support for the creation of the SSM yet they criticised 
the manner in which it was done and notably direct ECB supervision (Deutsche Bank 
2012 & 2013; Bloomberg 2012). They were the only German banks to do so. The 
position of associations representing the publicly owned Landesbanken and Savings 
Banks (the VOB) and Cooperatives (the BVR) were clear in their opposition to the 
extension of direct ECB supervision to smaller German banks (BVR/VÖB/DSGV 
2012; Financial Times, 9 September 2012; Financial Times 2 December 2012). The 
German federal government succeeded in resisting direct ECB supervision of the 
smaller savings and cooperative banks. However, the damage caused to some 
Landesbanken during the financial crisis, large government bail-outs, Commission-
imposed restructuring and stagnant lending placed them in a politically weakened 
position (Deeg and Donnelly, this volume). German federal governments and the 
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Bundesbank have long called for the consolidation of banks in this sector (Hardie and 
Howarth 2009; 2013; Financial Times 14 September 2010).  
 
4. France and the SSM: national champions with a strong European presence 
 
The French government’s position on the SSM threshold was dictated directly by the 
structure of the French banking system and the concern that a far higher percentage of 
French bank assets (over 80 per cent) would be subject to direct ECB supervision than 
any of the large European banking systems. The French banking system was 
somewhat more concentrated than the British and the five largest banks all held 
significant assets in other EU member states and especially the southern euro 
periphery. French bank exposure to the euro periphery was the greatest of any EU 
member state in total and in GDP terms (Table 2), a reflection of the impact of euro 
area membership which in turn encouraged interest in supranational banking 
supervision (hypotheses 1 and 2). The retail presence of the three large French 
commercial banks (BNP-Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole) in other EU 
member states (and notably other euro area member states) was far greater than 
British and German banks (Howarth 2013). Subsidiaries of these banks were also the 
largest (in terms of both assets and market share) of any foreign institutions in the 
euro periphery -- with a major retail and commercial presence in both the Italian and 
Greek banking systems in 2010 -- although retail presence in the euro periphery 
dropped significantly from 2010. 
 
In line with the second hypothesis, the internationalisation data points to significant 
French interest in supranational banking supervision to the extent that this contributed 
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to financial stability in the euro area and, specifically, in the euro periphery. In line 
with the second hypothesis, the French government (supported by the Commission) 
pushed for ECB involvement in supervision to cover all euro area banks. However, 
the French pushed for a de facto national supervision to continue through a ‘licensing’ 
system in which national supervisors would work on behalf of the ECB and according 
to common rules  (Financial Times, 5 December 2012). They argued that the division 
into larger and smaller banks made little economic sense, given that banking crises 
often originated with smaller, fast-expanding banks (such as Spanish cajas, see Royo 
2012).  
 
The French government expressed concern over the unequal treatment of member 
states given that its national banking system was dominated by five very large 
institutions which would all end up being directly supervised by the ECB (Financial 
Times, 14 November 2012). Indeed, the agreed threshold resulted in direct ECB 
supervision of thirteen French financial institutions holding over 95 per cent of 
national banking assets compared to 25 German banks and 50 per cent of national 
assets (ECB 2014). French opposition to differential treatment also reflects French 
government insistence of a lack of a ‘Too big to fail’ problem facing French banks 
and a longstanding strategy of constructing large national champions engaged in a 
range of banking activities (Howarth 2013). However, bank system structure dictated 
preferences. 
 
In its official policy statements, the French Banking Federation (FBF) explicitly 
shared the government’s policy position: in favour of reinforced euro area rules on 
supervision but with continued national control (FBF 2012). The two largest non-
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listed banks -- Crédit Mutuel and BPCE (a federation of cooperative and savings 
banks) and the part-listed Crédit Agricole -- expressed concerns -- given their funding 
structure -- but not opposition (Crédit Agricole 2014). All expressed concern on the 
potential for uneven supervisory treatment of different sized institutions. The close 
relationship between administrative elites staffing high-level positions in formerly 
state-owned banks (Schmidt 1996, Rouban 2010) suggests a significant conflation of 
private and public interests. Overall, France was the main member state engine of BU 
and the SSM (see Donnelly 2014, Howarth and Quaglia 2013, interviews with 
German policy makers 30 October 2014, interviews with Commission officials 13-14 
November 2014).  
 
5. The euro outsiders:  in or out? 
 
Both hypotheses tested in this paper explain effectively the positioning of the euro 
outsiders on SSM participation. The UK banking system was dominated by one large 
nationally-focused bank (Lloyds-TSB) and three large, highly internationalised and 
well-capitalised institutions with limited reliance on the domestic real economy. UK 
headquartered bank assets were the most international (extra-European) of any EU 
member state. The British banking system appears only moderately concentrated in 
terms of total bank assets (Figure 1) with the most significant foreign presence of any 
large EU member state (Table 3). However, the British retail banking market was 
highly concentrated in part because many of the foreign banks with London-based 
subsidiaries were involved little in retail banking. In the 2000s, the bulk of lending to 
domestic nonfinancial companies and households (consistently over 80 per cent) was 
provided by the five largest UK-headquartered banks and a subsidiary of Santander, 
17 
 
the Spanish bank (Bank of England, 2013). Had the UK opted to participate in the 
SSM, over 90 per cent of its retail bank assets would have held by banks subject to 
direct ECB supervision. Yet at the same time, domestic lending formed only a small 
part of most of these banks’ assets -- the principal exception being the UK subsidiary 
of Santander (Bank of England data). The three largest UK-headquartered banks were 
major international players and were among the world’s ten largest banks in terms of 
asset size throughout most of the 2000s. All three held a majority of their assets 
internationally and a large majority of these international assets beyond Europe 
(Figure 2). British banks had some exposure to the euro periphery but this was 
comparatively limited (Table 2). 
 
Overall, the UK government was by and large supportive of BU and the SSM for euro 
area member states, notably as a way to tackle the sovereign debt crisis afflicting the 
euro area periphery and to ensure financial stability therein (see, for example, The 
Telegraph, 13 December 2012, 19 December 2012).2 However, it was clear that the 
UK did not want to be part of the new institutional arrangements (for example, 
Financial Times, 11 October 2013) – it did not face the inconsistent quartet, 
confirming the first hypothesis. Its banking system was not only the most 
‘Europeanised’ of the largest six EU member state banking systems in terms of the 
holdings of other EU-headquartered banks in the UK (as both a percentage and in 
total terms) and British bank holdings elsewhere in the EU (in total terms), it was also 
                                                
2 For example, British Treasury Minister Osborne argued: ‘We have consistently said 
we support the creation of a eurozone banking union, but that the interests of British 
taxpayers must be protected’ (The Telegraph, 19 December 2013). 
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very internationalized in terms of non EU headquartered banks active in the UK and 
the activities of British banks abroad. The UK was most exposed to the potential 
instability of globally systemic banks, which affected the British banking system 
more in relative terms than others in Europe. Hence, British policy makers did not 
campaign for supranational solutions in the EU. Similarly, all the large British banks 
by and large supported the creation of the SSM but none sought British participation 
(BBA 2012). 
 
Both hypotheses are also met in the Swedish case. The Swedish government’s 
decision not to participate in Banking Union owed largely to the fact that so few bank 
assets in the country were held by EU-owned subsidiaries or branches (the lowest 
percentage in the EU at the end of 2012) yet the bulk of bank assets (almost 90 per 
cent) would be covered by direct ECB supervision because of a high level of 
concentration of the banking system (Darvas and Wolff, 2013). This limited EU-bank 
presence in the Swedish market weighed more heavily than the significant 
international (and specifically Euro area) presence of Swedish banks -- and notably in 
Finland and the Baltic States (including the Hansabank subsidiary of Swedbank).  
Swedish exposure to the euro periphery was very limited (Table 2) further 
discouraging interest. The Swedish government also expressed concern as to the 
second-class position of non-euro Member States in the SSM (Financial Times, 11 
December 2012, Spendzharova and Bayram 2014).  
 
The expression of a clear Danish preference against membership was also in line with 
both hypotheses: the country would not be participating in the single currency for the 
foreseeable future, only approximately 16 per cent of total Danish bank assets were 
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held by EU-owned subsidiaries (2012 figures) and a significant percentage of these by 
Swedish banks. Only 29 per cent of Danish assets abroad were in the euro area (less 
than Danish assets in Sweden and Norway alone) and only 5 per cent of total Danish 
bank assets. By late 2013, only 1.5 per cent of Danish bank assets were in the euro 
periphery and these principally in Ireland. Despite its EMU opt-out, Danish initial 
policy on the SSM and other elements of BU can be described as positive ‘wait and 
see’. This stance stemmed from limited monetary policy autonomy (Denmark 
maintained its currency in the ERM II) and the large size of the country’s banking 
sector (four times GDP at the end of 2012) and the even bigger relative size of the 
country’s financial sector (the third highest in the EU compared to GDP) (interview 
Danish central bank official, March 2014). 
 
The banking systems of most Central and Eastern European Member States were 
dominated by foreign institutions -- although to varying degrees (see Table 3). Some 
have argued that non-participation in the SSM (Banking Union) might have a 
devastating effect on domestic banks as depositors shifted their accounts to banks 
headquartered in BU Member States (Darva and Woolf, 2013). In line with the second 
hypothesis, in 2014, Romania and Bulgaria, which have a very high degree of foreign 
ownership, applied to join the SSM, through a special cooperation arrangement with 
the SSM which would result in direct ECB supervision of the largest banks in the two 
countries. In both countries, SSM participation was presented as the first step to full 
BU membership (Reuters 15 July 2014) -- even though participation in the single 
currency was unlikely in the near future, which confirms the first hypothesis. In 
Bulgaria this move was part of a more general effort to stave off a major banking 
crisis following the collapse of the countries fourth largest bank (New York Times 4 
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August 2014). Latvia and Lithuania, dominated by subsidiaries of Swedish banks, had 
less interest in joining Banking Union given Swedish non-membership, although 
Latvia’s intention to enter the euro area in 2014 pushed its government to support the 
form of membership on offer and the approval of Lithuanian euro area membership in 
July 2014 resulted in accession to the SSM and other BU elements. 
 
Three CEECs made clear their opposition to SSM / BU membership:  Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic. Compared to most CEECS, where foreign bank 
penetration from EU banks exceeded 70 per cent, in Hungary and Poland it was ‘only’ 
54 and 56 per cent respectively. Hence, according to the second hypothesis, these two 
countries had somewhat less incentive to join the SSM. Similarly, participation in the 
euro area was not a priority for the government of either of these member states. The 
main exception remains the Czech republic, where foreign ownership by EU banks 
was high, but the country expressed no intention of joining the SSM. Determined 
Czech government reluctance on joining the single currency – and thus the absence of 
the inconsistent quartet even in the medium term – shaped Czech policy on the SSM. 
 
Amongst the reasons that encouraged CEEC euro-outsiders to seek membership, 
participation in the SSM was seen in terms of improving the credibility of national 
prudential arrangements, overseen by the ECB. The ECB would possess information 
about the banks’ headquarters and subsidiaries, allowing more effective supervision 
and decision-making. However, there were also several reasons not to participate in 
the SSM. Non-euro Member States were worried about their second-class status, with 
limited decision-making power as compared to euro area members. The ECB might 
be less prone to focus on the risks building in non-euro and smaller Member States. 
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The as yet undetermined implications of full BU also encouraged some non-euro 
Member States to adopt a cautious position on the SSM.  
 
The main priority of the British government and British banks (BBA 2012) was to 
avoid a potential euro area block within the single financial market. The British, 
supported by seven other non-euro Member State governments, threatened to block 
Banking Union if there were insufficient safeguards put in place for the ‘euro-
outsiders’ (Financial Times, 8 November 2012). Crucially, the British feared the 
adoption of subsequent financial legislation that would be detrimental to the British 
financial sector. However, the broader issue of concern was the satisfactory co-
existence of a more integrated euro area core and the non-core Member States.  
 
In the European Banking Authority (EBA) – the supervisory body responsible for 
EU-wide bank stress tests – the British feared a euro area majority able to impose its 
rules on the euro outsiders. Hence, as early as the summer of 2012, the British (joined 
by the Swedish and Danish) demanded an EBA voting reform:  that any decision by 
the Authority should be approved by a minimum number of Member States outside 
the Banking Union and thus effectively by a ‘double majority’ of Member States 
inside and outside the Banking Union. The outcome of negotiations was a 
compromise involving the creation of a double majority system until the number of 
non-Banking Union Member States dwindled to less than four.  
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Conclusions 
 
This article has first put forward two complementary hypotheses about national 
preferences on the SSM and has then applied them to the empirical record in order to 
assess their explanatory power. The main findings suggests that the limited 
internationalisation of the German banking system and the very small number of 
German banks with major cross-border operations meant that one of the four elements 
of the inconsistent quartet was less relevant for German policy makers, thus 
decreasing German interest in the SSM (and BU more generally). German policy 
makers resisted the ECB’s supervision of the country’s public Landesbanken and 
savings banks. French government policy was directed by support for the SSM as a 
stepping stone to the creation of support mechanisms for banks but also by opposition 
to the unequal treatment of member states given that France’s banking system was 
dominated by five very large institutions with a strong or at least significant euro area 
presence which would all end up being directly supervised by the ECB.  
 
British policy makers were less interested in participating in the SSM because three of 
the four largest British banks were major international players and one was almost 
entirely domestic in its activities. Moreover, in the UK, a large percentage of bank 
assets were held by non EU foreign owned banks. The extra-EU nature of cross-
border banking in the UK discouraged participation in the SSM and Banking Union. 
The position of the other euro outsiders was determined in most cases by the extent of 
the penetration of euro area headquartered banks (second hypothesis). Position on 
euro area membership was a directing factor (first hypothesis) for all the euro 
outsiders:  two about to join the euro (Latvia and Lithuania), two in no hurry to join 
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(Hungary and Poland) and four unlikely to join (the Czech Republic, UK, Sweden and 
Denmark). 
 
This political economy analysis contributes to the academic literature in two ways. It 
explains the domestic sources of national preference formation on the SSM and BU 
more generally. In so doing, it complements the accounts that focus on the political 
negotiations on BU, at the EU or domestically, explaining why policy-makers and 
different parts of the financial industry (or even individual banks, e.g. Deutsche Bank) 
had the preferences they had. It outlines the different configuration (principally 
internationalisation patterns) of a range of national banking systems in the EU in 
order to explain preferences on the SSM and BU. Despite more than sixty years of 
financial integration in the EU and the near completion of the Single Financial Market, 
national banking systems remains very distinct, complicating the negotiations on BU 
and ensuring the persistence of national variation in supervisory practice. 
  
The key argument of this paper is that euro area member states that faced the 
‘inconsistent quartet’ had different preferences on the SSM, depending on the 
configuration of their national banking systems. Arguably, this two-step political 
economy analysis could be used to explain national preferences on the other main 
elements of BU. Further research could therefore assess the explanatory power of the 
inconsistent quartet and the configuration of national financial system with reference 
to the Single Resolution Mechanism and the non agreement on the common Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme (DGS). Obviously, in these cases, an additional element, namely 
moral hazard, should be taken into account given the ultimately fiscal implications of 
resolution and the proposed DGS. 
24 
 
References 
 
Allen, F. and Gale D. (2000) Comparing Financial Systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
BBA (British Banking Association) (2012) ‘BBA statement on European Commission 
banking union proposals’, 12 September, https://www.bba.org.uk/news/press-releases. 
 
BDB (2013) Bankenverband: Bankenunion Zügig Vorantreiben – Die Euro-Zone 
Stärken (Berlin: Bundesverband Deutscher Banken). 
 
Begg, D., De Grauwe, P., Giavazzi, F., Uhlig, H. and Wyplosz, C (1998a) ‘The ECB: 
safe at any speed?’, Monitoring the European Central Bank, 1, London: CEPR. 
 
——, F. Giavazzi, J. Von Hagen, and C. Wyplosz (1998b) ‘Economic and Monetary 
Union: Getting the end-game right’, Monitoring European Integration, 7, London: 
CEPR. 
 
Bloomberg (2012) ‘Commerzbank’s Blessing Sees More Cooperation With Insurers’, 
20 September, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-
20/commerzbank-s-blassing-sees-more-cooperation-with-insurers.html. 
 
Busch, A. (2009) Banking Regulation and Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Bulmer, S.(2014) Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and 
Domestic Politics, West European Politics, 37, 6. 
 
BVR/VÖB/DSGV (2012) Gemeinsames Positionspapier Zu Einem Einheitlichen 
Aufsichtsmechanismus Für Kreditinstitute Im Sinne Der Gipfelerklärung Der 
Mitglieder Des Euro-Währungsgebiets Vom 29. Juni 2012 (Berlin: Bundesverband 
der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken; Bundesverband Öffentlicher 
Banken Deutschlands; Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband). 
 
Clift, B. (2012) ‘French Responses to the Global Economic Crisis: The Political 
Economy of ‘Post-Dirigisme’ and New State Activism’. In Grant, W. and Wilson, G. 
(eds) Aftershock: The Global Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 206–225.  
 
Commission of the European Communities (2012a) ‘Proposal for a Council 
Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions’. COM(2012) 511 
final, 12 September. 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2012b) ‘Proposal for a Regulation 
establishing a European supervisory authority (European banking authority) [. . .]’. 
COM(2012) 512 final, 12 September. 
 
25 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2012c) ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A roadmap towards a 
banking union’. COM(2012) 510 final, 12 September. 
Crédit Agricole (2014) ‘Union bancaire : Crédit Agricole signale plusieurs 
inquiétudes autour de la supervision unique de la BCE’, EasyBourse, 14 May, 
https://www.easybourse.com/bourse/international/article/28302/union-bancaire-
credit-agricole-signale-plusieurs-inquietudes-autour-de-la-supervision-unique-de-la-
bce.html. 
Darvas, Z. and Wolff, G. (2013) ‘Should Non-Euro Area Countries Join the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism’. Bruegel Policy Contribution, No. 2013/06, March. 
 
Deeg, R. (1999) Finance Capitalism Unveiled: Banks and the German Political 
Economy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Deeg, R. (2010) ‘Institutional Change in Financial Systems’. In Morgan, G., J. L., 
Campbell, C. Crouch, O-K. Pedersen, and R. Whitley (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Institutional Analysis, Oxford: OUP: 312–351. 
 
Deutsche bank (2012) ‘EU Banking Union: Do it right, not hastily’, EU Monitor: 
European Integration, 23 July, Frankfurt:  DB Research. 
 
-- (2013) ‘EU Banking Union:  Right Idea, poor execution’, EU Monitor: European 
Integration, 4 September, Frankfurt:  DB Research. 
 
Donnelly S. (2014) ‘Power Politics and the Undersupply of Financial Stability in 
Europe’, Review of International Political Economy, Review of International Political 
Economy, 21, 4: 980-1005. 
 
Deeg, R. and Donnelly, S. (this volume). 
 
Dyson, K. (2000) The Politics of the Eurozone, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dyson K. and Featherstone (1999) The Road to Maastricht, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Epstein, R. (2013) ‘When do foreign banks “cut and run”? Evidence from west 
European bailouts and east European markets’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 21, 4, pp. XX.  
 
Epstein R. and Rhodes M. (2014) ‘International in Life, National in Death?: Banking 
Nationalism on the Road to Banking Union’ 
 
Epstein R. and Rhodes M. (this volume) 
 
European Central Bank (ECB) (2014) ‘Decision of the ECB identifying the credit 
institutions that are subject to the comprehensive assessment’, ECB/2014/3. 
 
26 
 
European Council (2012a) ‘Council Agrees Position on Single Supervisory 
Mechanism’. 17739/12, PRESSE 528, 13 December, Brussels. Available at: 
«http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/134265.
pdf». 
 
European Council (2012b) ‘The European Council Agrees on a Roadmap for the 
Completion of Economic and Monetary Union’, 14 December. Available at: 
«http://www.european-council. 
europa.eu/home-page/highlights/the-european-council-agrees-on-a-roadmap-for-
thecompletion-of-economic-and-monetary-union». 
 
European Council (2012c) ‘Conclusions on Completing EMU’, 14 
December.Available at: «http:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134320.pdf». 
 
FBF (2012) ‘The FBF Favours a Single Supervision Mechanism for European Banks’, 
Original as ‘La FBF est favorable à une supervision européenne unique des banques’, 
Paris: Fédération Bancaire Française, 12 September, available at 
http://www.fbf.fr/en/press-room/press-releases/the-fbf-favours-a-single-supervision-
mechanism-for-european-banks 
 
Fischer, M. J., C. Hainz, J. Rocholl and S. Steffen (2011) ‘Government Guarantees 
and Bank Risk Taking Incentives’, AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available on-
lined; accessed on 12 September 2012. 
 
Goodhart, C., ed, (2000) Which Lender of Last Resort for Europe?, Central Banking 
Publications. 
 
-- (1999) ‘Myths about the Lender of Last Resort’, Journal of International Finance 2. 
 
Hall P. (2014) ‘Varieties of Capitalism and the Euro Crisis’, West European Politics 
37, 6 
 
Hansen, R. et al. (2014) Deficits, Democracy, and Demographics: Europe’s Three 
Crises, West European Politics, 37, 6. 
 
Hardie, I. and D. Howarth (2009) ‘Die Krise but not La Crise?: The Financial Crisis 
and the Transformation of German and French Banking Systems’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 47, 5. pp. 1017–1039. 
 
Hardie, I. and D. Howarth (eds.). (2013) Market-Based Banking, Varieties of 
Financial Capitalism and the Financial Crisis, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Hardie, I., D. Howarth, S. Maxfield, and A. Verdun. (2013) ‘Banks and the False 
Dichotomy in the Comparative Political Economy of Finance’, World Politics, 65, 4, 
691-728. 
 
Howarth, D. (2013) ‘France and the International Financial Crisis: the Legacy of 
State-led Finance’, Governance, 26 (3), 369–395. 
 
27 
 
Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L. (2013) ‘Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the 
Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s Banks and “Completing” 
Economic and Monetary Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51, s1, 2013, 
pp. 103-123. 
 
Johnson, J. and Barnes A. (2014), ‘Financial Nationalism after the Crisis: The 
Hungarian Experience’, Review of International Political Economy, XX 
 
Leblond, P. (2014) ‘The logic of a bnaking union for Europe’, Journal of Banking 
Regulation, 15, pp. 288-298. 
 
Macartney, H. (2014) ‘From Merlin to Oz: The strange case of failed lending targets 
in the UK’, Review of International Political Economy, 21, 4: 820-846. 
 
Mourlon-Druol E. (2014) Don’t Blame the Euro: Historical Reflections on the Roots 
of the Eurozone Crisis , West European Politics 37, 6. 
 
Padoa-Schioppa, T. (1982) ‘Capital Mobility: Why is the Treaty Not Implemented?’, 
in Padoa-Schioppa, T. (1994), The Road to Monetary Union in Europe, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Pedersen, T. (1998) Germany, France and the Integration of Europe: A realist 
interpretation, London:  Pinter 
 
Putnam, R. (1988), ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of the Two-Level 
Game’, International Organization, 42, 3, pp. 427-460. 
 
Quaglia, L. and Royo S. (2014) ‘Banks and the political economy of the sovereign 
debt crisis in Italy and Spain’, RIPE, forthcoming. 
 
Rouban, L. (2010) ‘L’inspection générale des Finances, 1958-2008: pantouflage et 
renouveau des strategies élitaires’, Sociologies Pratiques, 21, 2, pp. 19-34. 
 
Royo S. (2012) ‘How Did the Spanish Financial System Survive the First Stage of the 
Global Crisis?’, Governance, 26 (4): 631-56. 
 
Salines, M., Glöckler, G. and Truchlewski, Z. (2012) ‘Existential crisis, incremental 
response: the eurozone’s dual institutional evolution 2007-2011’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 19(5): 665-681. 
 
Schimmelfennig, F. (2014): 'A Differentiated Leap Forward: Graded Membership in 
EU Banking Regulation' 
 
Schmidt, V. (1996) From State to Market? The Transformation of French Business 
and Government, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schoenmaker D. (2011) ‘The Financial Trilemma’, Duisenberg school of finance - 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. 
 
28 
 
-- (2013) Governance of International Banking: The Financial Trilemma, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Simpson, C. (2013) ‘The German Sparkassen (Savings Banks): A Commentary and 
Case Study’, London:  Civitas (Institute for Civil Society); available on-line; accessed 
2 February 2014. 
 
Spendzharova A. (2014), ‘Banking union under construction: The impact of foreign 
ownership and domestic bank internationalization on European Union member-states’ 
regulatory preferences in banking supervision’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 21, 4: 949-979. 
 
Spendzharova, A. and Bayram, E. (2014) ‘Banking Union or Solve it Yourself? The 
Swedish-Baltic Experience of Cross-Border Crisis Management’ (this volume). 
 
Verdun, A. (2000) European Response to Globalisation, London: McMillan. 
 
Walsh, J. (2000) European Monetary Integration and Domestic Politics. Britain, 
France and Italy, London : Lynner Rienner. 
 
Zysman J. (1983) Governments, Markets and Growth, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1: Banking system concentration 
 
Source:  ECB (2013) Banking Structures Report 
 
Figure 2: Bank internationalization (per cent of total bank assets, 2007-2011 
average) 
Sources:  Bank of England, Banque de France, Bundesbank statistical databases. 
Registration documents for Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, HSBC, BNP Paribas, 
Crédit Agricole and Société Générale. Notes: The three largest Germany-
headquartered banks (measured by assets) became two with the forced merger of 
Dresdner and Commerzbank. 
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Table 1: Internationalisation of EU-27 banking systems 2010-2013 (per cent of 
total assets held outside home member state, average, rounded) 
 Domestic RoW EU Euro area 
Euro area     
Austria 79 6 15 8 
Belgium 83 6 11 8 
Cyprus 89 3 4 4 
Estonia 99 0 1 0 
Finland 94 1 5 1 
France 75 13 13 11 
Germany 72 15 14 11 
Greece 91 0 9 2 
Ireland 84 10 6 2 
Italy 79 3 18 3 
Malta 83 5 12 9 
Netherlands 73 11 16 12 
Portugal 81 6 13 13 
Slovenia 93 0 7 7 
Slovakia 99 0 1 1 
Spain 72 13 15 8 
Non Euro      
Bulgaria 96 1 3 2 
Czech R. 97 0 3 3 
Denmark 85 2 13 5 
Hungary 96 0 4 3 
Latvia 98 1 1 0 
Lithuania 96 0 4 3 
Poland 94 0 6 5 
Romania 97 1 2 2 
Sweden 84 7 9 5 
United Kingdom 60 26 15 14 
Source: national central bank data.  
*Periphery includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Excluding domestic 
market, if one of five euro area periphery countries. 
 
 
Table 2: European Banking Systems’ Exposure to Euro Periphery debt 
(sovereign and corporate) 
 12.2010 
(million 
dollars) 
% of bank 
assets 
12.2010 
 
 
12.2013 
(million 
dollars) 
% of bank 
assets 
12.2013 
% of GDP 
12.2013 
Euro area      
Austria 36650 3.2 19890 1.8 5.6 
Belgium 91402 11.6    43159 6.7 19.1 
Finland 3398 20.1 974 5 13.9 
France 647408 7.8 526801 6.2 26.2 
Germany 532729  5.3 372755 4.2 12.6 
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Italy* 52329  1.5 34364 1 2.7 
Netherlands 151262 4.8 106837 3.4 13.5 
Spain* 127654 2.7 107486 2.4 7.8 
Non Euro       
Denmark 19579 1.9 15691 1.5 6.4 
Sweden 8604 0.5  6456 0.3 0.9 
UK 368718 3.9   282647 3.1 15.3 
Source: BIS, ECB statistical warehouse. 
*Excluding domestically held debt 
 
Table 3: Foreign penetration into EU-27 banking systems end 2009 / end 2012 
(per cent of total banks assets held by subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks) 
and 2009-2012 change (rounded to the nearest 0.5) 
 EU 2009 RoW 2009 EU 2012 RoW 2012 EU 2009-12 
Euro area      
Austria 15 4.5 16 6 1 
Belgium 54 6 51 5 -3* 
Cyprus 33 8 17 16.5 -16 
Estonia 95 0 85 11.5 -10 
Finland 67 0 67 8 0 
France 10 0.5 10 0.5 0 
Germany 10 0.5 11 1 1 
Greece 21 18.5 16 0 -5 
Ireland 36 7 29 10 -14 
Italy 12 0.5 13 0.5 1 
Luxembourg 65 29 67 26 2 
Malta 35 32 32 30 -3 
Netherlands 3 1 9 2 6 
Portugal 22 1 20 0.5 -2 
Slovenia 29 0.5 28.5 1.5 -0.5 
Slovakia 96 0 96 0 0 
Spain 10 0 9 0 -1 
Non Euro 
in 2012 
     
Bulgaria 82 2 73 0 -9 
Czech R. 90 4 86 5 -4 
Denmark 18 2 16 2 -2 
Hungary 54 5 54 5 0 
Latvia 63 4 47 4 -15 
Lithuania 83 0 72 2 -11 
Poland 56 8 56 9 0 
Romania 76 0.5 71 1 -5 
Sweden 7 1 7 3 0 
United 
Kingdom 
26 26 17 28.5 -9 
Source: national central bank data, ECB (2013) EU Banking Structures (2010, 2013) 
*The presence of other EU headquartered banks in Belgium increased markedly from 
2008 to 2009.  The decrease between 2009-12 should take this into consideration. 
 
